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The change appears driven by a shift in firms’ incentives to supply additional information
to lenders and lenders seem to value this information. The increase in timely loss
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This paper investigates whether firms attempt to make their accounting statements
more conservative in response to the changes in the banking industry. Such a response
might arise since firms’ financial statements are used extensively by banks and other
creditors in making lending decisions and monitoring borrowers. One aspect of
information that is of high value to lenders is a firm’s timely loss recognition (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986; Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). Evidence suggests that timely loss
recognition is related to a firm’s cost of credit in the U.S. (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and
Harris, 2002; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008; and Nikolaev, 2010) and the
development of credit markets internationally (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003; Ball, Robin,
and Sadka, 2008). If changes in the banking sector affect lenders’ demand for
conservatism, such as the arrival of new lenders that rely more heavily on information
contained in firms’ financial statements, firms may respond by changing their accounting
practices.1
While the evidence suggests that firms are likely to adjust their accounting
policies in response to changes in the banking sector, there is little direct evidence of this
occurring. Empirical evidence is sparse in part because of the difficulty of isolating a
change in the banking sector that affects the costs and benefits of being conservative but
is not related to other factors that may also affect reporting policies. Our paper
overcomes this challenge by exploiting an exogenous increase in the benefit of being
conservative caused by the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s.
The entry of foreign banks into India is likely to increase the banking sector’s

1

Throughout the paper we use the term conservatism and timely loss recognition interchangeably. Timely
loss recognition refers to the timely incorporation of economic losses into accounting earnings (Basu, 1997;
Watts, 2003a) and it is also termed as asymmetric timeliness or conditional conservatism. Ball and
Shivakumar (2005, pp. 88-92) explain the role of conditional conservatism in efficient contracting, and
contrast it with unconditional conservatism which is argued to have no positive effect on efficient
contracting.
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demand for conservative financial statements in three unique ways. First, foreign banks
may be less able to acquire soft information about local firms, leading them to place a
greater emphasis on the information contained within firms’ financial statements (Stein,
2002). This may be particularly true when foreign banks are from developed countries
where financial statements are commonly used to screen and monitor borrowers
(Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). Second, foreign banks’ tendency to ‘cream-skim’ the
larger, more profitable firms in developing countries (Dell’Arricia and Marquez, 2004;
Gormley, 2007; Sengupta, 2007; Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressal, 2008) may increase
domestic lenders’ emphasis on conservative financial statements. Because creamskimming by foreign banks lowers the average quality of borrowers seeking domestic
bank loans, domestic banks’ incentive to screen and monitor loans more intensely, which
could include looking for conservative financial statements, might increase (Gormley,
2007).2 Third, domestic lenders in developing countries, which may be initially less
sophisticated in their lending skills, may adopt the ‘best practices’ of foreign banks,
further increasing the importance of a firm’s accounting statements in the lending process
(Lensink and Hermes, 2004). Each of these changes in the banking sector is likely to
increase firms’ incentives to provide more conservative financial statements.
We assess whether firms adjust their timely recognition of losses in response to
changes in the banking industry using an exogenous regulatory change. In particular, we
make use of the staggered entry of foreign banks into India following the country’s 1994
commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some districts of India received a
foreign bank branch as early as 1994, while others did not receive such a branch until
2

In addition to scrutinizing a borrower’s hard information more closely, it is also possible that domestic
lenders improve the effectiveness of their ex ante screening and ex post monitoring by collecting more soft
information about each borrower. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
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2001, and as of today, many districts have yet to receive a foreign bank. Matching this
information to a large panel data set of firms’ audited financial statements, we compare
changes in timely loss recognition between domestic firms located geographically near
the new foreign banks and domestic firms located further from the new banks. The
variation both in the timing of the new foreign banks’ entries and in their location within
the country reduces potential confounding effects that might arise from other countrywide changes in firms’ accounting standards. Such country-wide changes would affect
all firms in India and therefore are unlikely to explain differential changes in accounting
choices for firms located geographically near foreign banks versus those that are not.
Another advantage to analyzing changes in timely loss recognition and changes in
the banking sector in India is our ability to obtain detailed firm-level data for both public
and private Indian firms. By using firm-level data, we can test for a heterogeneous effect
across firms as well as control for any differences in the types of firms located in areas
with a new foreign bank. The data on private firms, which are potentially more sensitive
to changes in local lending markets, also allow us to analyze the reporting policies for
firms that are generally not represented in most studies.
To measure a firm’s timely recognition of economic losses, we follow the
research design by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and apply an accrual-cash flow nonlinear regression technique. Since this measure only relies on the information in firms’
historical financial statements, we are able to calculate it for both public and private firms
in India. This is particularly important since the benefit of conservative financial
statements is likely greater for private firms after foreign bank entry.
Using the aforementioned framework, we find evidence that firms’ accounting
choices are associated with changes in the banking industry. The overall level of timely
3

loss recognition increases for firms located in the vicinity of new foreign banks, and the
timing of this increase coincides with foreign bank entry into each district. The increases
in timely loss recognition are also concentrated among debt-dependent firms with the
strongest incentives to adjust their accounting procedures so as to reduce information
asymmetries and alleviate financing constraints. More specifically, we find that smaller,
non-group, and private firms, particularly private firms with greater dependence on
external financing, increase their timely loss recognition the most. The findings are
robust to the use of different samples, time periods, and control variables. In addition to
the increase in timely loss recognition, we also find corroborating evidence of an increase
in write-offs of fixed assets and bad debt expenses. These changes are consistent with
firms increasing their conservatism in response to changes in the banking sector.
The evidence also indicates that lenders value this change in accounting
conservatism. Within districts that experience a foreign bank entry, we find the largest
increases in timely loss recognition occur, on average, among firms that maintain or
increase their level of borrowings following foreign bank entry, whereas firms that
experience declines in their debt levels exhibit no average increase.
Our findings add to the growing evidence that the benefits and costs of providing
high quality financial information can cause shifts in accounting choices. For example,
Willenborg (1999) and Leone, Rock, and Willenborg (2007) find that firms respond to
changes in the costs and benefits of providing information to equity holders in event of an
IPO; Zhang (2009) finds that borrowers with greater accounting conservatism are able to
borrow at lower cost; and Minnis (2011) finds that private firms undergo voluntary audits
in order to improve their access to the debt market. Our paper demonstrates that firms
also adapt their accounting policies, timely loss recognition in particular, to changes in
4

the banking industry. To the authors’ knowledge, this dynamic connection between
conservatism and banking sector characteristics has not been documented before.
Our findings also reinforce the importance of timely loss recognition and its role
in the debt contracting process (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Harris, 2002; Beatty,
Weber, and Yu, 2008; Guay, 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008). Rather
than analyze the importance of timely loss recognition in a static credit market, however,
our paper uses an exogenous regulatory change to test whether changes in the banking
industry are correlated to changes in firms’ accounting choices. We also explore how
these changes in accounting choices vary across firms, and whether these changes affect
firms’ credit access. There is little existing evidence on the relation between financial
reporting and access to debt financing (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010).
Our paper also provides supporting evidence to the argument of Ball (2001) and
Kothari (2001) that institutional mechanisms are important in shaping a country’s
accounting choices. Previous research has explored the relation between accounting
practices and legal institutions (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000), equity market
development and investor rights (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003), tax systems (Ali and
Hwang, 2000; Guenther and Young, 2000) and political connections (Chaney, Faccio,
and Parsley, 2009). Our paper suggests that banking sector characteristics may also be
important in shaping a country’s accounting practices over time.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature that studies the relations between
foreign bank entry, domestic bank performance, interest rates, and firms’ debt usage.3
3

Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) uncover evidence that foreign bank entry is associated
with lower profit margins among domestic banks, while Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001), Haber and
Musacchio (2004), and Mian (2006) provide evidence that foreign banks tend to finance only larger, more
established firms. Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2006) find that entrepreneurs in countries with high
levels of foreign bank ownership perceive interest rates and access to loans as smaller constraints to their
operations. Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressal (2008) and Gormley (2010) find that foreign ownership is
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This paper compliments this literature by analyzing the changes in firms’ accounting
practices following foreign bank entry into a market where firms seemingly face very few
incentives to produce informative financial statements. Our evidence suggests that in this
type of environment, firms improve the conservatism of their financial statements
following the entry of lenders that place greater emphasis on these statements. The
observed increase in conservatism is also consistent with theories suggesting that
financial sector competition may affect the importance of firms’ informationalopaqueness (Dell’Arricia and Marquez, 2004; Gormley, 2007; Sengupta, 2007) and
supports the argument that firms’ incentive to provide conservative financial statements
is important (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003; Ball, Robin, and Sadka, 2008).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a review of
India’s policy change. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
data and research design. Section 4 presents empirical results, and Section 5 presents
robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
1. Description of banking sector changes in India
Prior to 1991, India’s economy and financial system were heavily regulated and
dominated by the public sector. Following a balance of payments crisis in 1991, however,
a number of structural reforms were implemented that greatly deregulated many
economic activities. In November 1991, a broad financial reform agenda was established
in India by the Committee on the Financial System (CFS). One of the committee’s

negatively related to aggregate and firm-level measures of debt-usage, while within Eastern European
countries, Giannetti, and Ongena (2009a) find the share of foreign lending to be positively related to firmlevel sales and overall debt usage, particularly for larger firms. Giannetti and Ongena (2009b) also find
that foreign bank entry may make bank relationships more stable and enhance financial access. Berger,
Klapper, Peria, and Zaidi (2008) find suggestive evidence that firms choose to have multiple bank
relationships as an insurance against the ‘fragility’ of foreign bank relationships.
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recommendations to meet this goal was to introduce greater competition into the banking
system by allowing more foreign banks to enter India.
However, no significant action was taken by the Government of India regarding
the CFS recommendation on foreign banks until April 1994 when the government agreed
to allow for an expansion of foreign banks under the General Agreement on Trades in
Services (GATS). In the initial GATS agreement, India committed to issue five additional
branch licenses to both new and existing foreign banks each year. In a subsequent
supplemental agreement in July 1995, India increased the limit to eight licenses per year,
and in February 1998, the limit was increased to 12. While there were no restrictions on
where foreign banks could choose to establish new branches, the expansion of foreign
banks in India was allowed by de novo branches only.4
In the years preceding the signing of the GATS agreement, very few licenses for
new foreign bank branches were granted, and the presence of foreign banks in India was
limited. On March 31, 1994 there were 24 foreign banks with 156 branches in India.
Most of these banks, however, had begun operations before India’s first nationalization of
private banks in April 1969, and only seven new branches had opened since 1990.
Moreover, most of India’s 575 districts did not have a foreign bank, as roughly 75
percent of these foreign bank branches were concentrated in districts encompassing
India’s three largest cities: Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata.
In the eight years following the acceptance of GATS, however, 17 new foreign
banks and 89 new foreign bank branches were opened in India bringing the total number
4

Foreign banks were not allowed to own controlling stakes in domestic banks, and foreign banks wishing
to establish new branches needed to seek Reserve Bank of India approval, as do all banks under Section 23
of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Requests for new branches are evaluated on the “merits of each case
and taking into consideration overall financial position of the bank, quality of its management, efficacy of
the internal control system, profitability, and other relevant factors”. See “Master Circular on Branch
Licensing,” DBOD.No. BL.BC. 5/22.01.001/2004, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, pp. 4.
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foreign banks to 41 with 212 branches as of March 2002.5 The expansion of foreign
banks also increased their representation outside of India’s most populous cities, as the
number of districts with a foreign bank increased from 18 to 26, and foreign banks’ share
of total long-term loans increased as well. In March 1994, foreign banks accounted for
five percent of all outstanding long-term loans, but with their expansion of branches, their
share of long-term loans increased and averaged roughly eight percent from 1996 to
1998, and 10 percent from 1999 to 2001. Moreover, foreign bank entry was sizeable in
the eight districts receiving their first foreign bank. By 2003, foreign banks accounted for
roughly 5.5 percent of long-term loans in these districts.
While foreign banks’ entry, as measured by captured market share, was relatively
small, it had a significant impact on local credit markets and firms. Gormley (2010)
finds that while bank borrowings increased for large, profitable firms following foreign
bank entry into India, the average domestic firm located in the vicinity of a new foreign
bank experienced a drop in bank borrowings. These declines were larger on average
among firms generally considered more informationally-opaque, such as smaller firms
and firms with fewer tangible assets. The drop in credit also appears to adversely affect
the performance of smaller firms with greater dependence on external financing. The
experience of India is consistent with the cross-country evidence of Detragiache, Gupta,
and Tressal (2008), which also finds evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with
reduced bank credit among informationally-opaque firms.
The reduced use of debt for many firms in India following foreign bank entry
might suggest that the benefit of providing more conservative financial statements to

5

33 foreign bank branches closed during this time period, so the net change was only 56. 17 of these
closures were from ANZ Grindlays Bank Ltd. and five from Standard Chartered Bank in 1998 and 1999.
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lenders increased. We now turn to exploring why this might occur and how this might
vary across firms.
2. Hypotheses development
In making lending decisions, banks face ex-ante information asymmetry and expost moral hazard problems. To overcome these frictions, banks can adopt stringent
screening standards (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984) and/or monitor borrowers
(Diamond, 1984). Each requires information about the creditworthiness of borrowers.
While some information on credit quality can be obtained from borrowers (soft
information), credit agencies, suppliers, and customers of a firm, a large share of the
information used by lenders will be contained in the firms’ financial statements.
One particular accounting metric that is valuable to lenders is the timely
accounting recognition of economic losses (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Ahmed,
Billings, Morton, and Harris, 2002; Watts, 2003a, 2003b; Beatty, Weber, and Yu, 2008).
Because of lenders’ asymmetric payoff from firms’ net assets (lenders incur a loss when
the net assets of borrower are below the principal but are not compensated when the net
assets exceed the principal), lenders are concerned with the lower bound of a borrower’s
net asset value. Timely loss recognition ensures, however, that expected losses are
reflected in the financial statements earlier and that the borrowers’ true net asset value is
not overstated (Watts, 2003a). This lower bound is informative to the lenders in making
lending decisions and in specifying financial covenants.6 Timely loss recognition also
increases the effectiveness of ex-post monitoring because it better informs lenders about a

6

There is evidence that banks in India use covenants to monitor borrowers. For example, on February 11,
2001, the Financial Times reported that Indian banks “have been asked by the Reserve Bank of India to
make bill finance one of the covenants for sanction of working capital credit limits”.
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borrower’s ability to repay, and the decreased reported earnings help constrain dividends,
thus alleviating the ex-post moral hazard problems (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Several studies find evidence consistent with timely loss recognition having a
positive effect on debt contract efficiency. Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Harris (2002)
find evidence that timely loss recognition plays an important role in mitigating
bondholder and shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing firms’
borrowing costs. Zhang (2008) shows that timely loss recognition benefits lenders
through a timely signaling of default risk, and benefits borrowers through a lower cost of
debt. Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) find evidence that debt covenants and timely loss
recognition are complementary in meeting lenders’ demand, and Nikolaev (2010) finds
that timely loss recognition compliments the use of covenants to address agency costs.
On the other hand, timely loss recognition can be costly for firms. Earlier
recognition of losses lowers stated earnings, which may reduce outsiders’ valuation of the
company, constrain dividend payment to shareholders, adversely affect managerial
compensation, and potentially lower firm’s ability to obtain external credit in the shortrun (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Harris, 2002). Firms also violate debt covenants
earlier when they are timely in their recognition of losses (Zhang, 2008), and such
violations can be costly for firms (Roberts and Sufi, 2009). Timely loss recognition may
also reduce a manager’s private benefits, particularly in countries with weak investor
protections (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003).
Given these costs, firms face a trade-off when choosing how timely to recognize
economic losses. Holding all else equal, loss recognition is expected to be timelier when
the potential benefits of doing so increase, and vice versa, loss recognition should be less

10

timely when the potential costs increase.
The entry of foreign banks into India is likely to increase the banking sector’s
demand for conservative financial statements in three unique ways. First, foreign banks
may be less able to acquire soft information about local firms, leading them to place a
greater emphasis on the information contained within firms’ financial statements (Stein,
2002). This may be particularly true when foreign banks are from developed countries
where financial statements are commonly used to screen and monitor borrowers
(Bushman and Piotroski, 2006). Second, foreign banks’ potential to ‘cream-skim’ the
larger, more profitable firms in developing countries (Dell’Arricia and Marquez, 2004;
Gormley, 2007; Sengupta, 2007; Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressal, 2008) may also
increase domestic lenders’ emphasis on conservative financial statements.7 Because
cream-skimming by foreign banks lowers the average quality of borrowers seeking
domestic bank loans, domestic banks’ incentive to screen loans more intensely, which
could include looking for conservative financial statements, might increase (Gormley,
2007). Third, domestic lenders in developing countries, which may be initially less
sophisticated in their lending skills, may adopt the ‘best practices’ of foreign banks,
further increasing the importance of a firm’s accounting statements in the lending process
(Lensink and Hermes, 2004). Each of these changes in the banking sector is likely to
increase firms’ incentives to provide more conservative financial statements.
The potential change in lenders’ demand for conservative financial reports
following foreign bank entry provides firms with an incentive to improve the
7

A general theme of these theoretical models is that foreign banks enjoy a lower marginal cost of capital
relative to domestic banks but have a high cost of acquiring soft information. This comparative advantage
leads to a segmented market where foreign banks tend to finance the largest, most profitable firms either
because the loans are larger (allowing foreign banks to take advantage of their lower marginal cost of
capital) or because the acquisition of soft information is not necessary for these firms.
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conservatism of their financial statements. Since timely loss recognition may help
accomplish this, we conjecture it will increase when foreign bank entry occurs.
Therefore, our first hypothesis is stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): The level of timely loss recognition will increase in districts
where foreign bank entry occurs.
A rejection of this hypothesis would indicate that foreign bank entry has no
impact on timely loss recognition. This might occur if foreign bank entry does not
increase the benefit of firms providing more conservative financial statements, or if
lenders do not value this particular change in a firm’s reporting policy because there exist
alternative mechanisms to accommodate lenders’ needs.
The increased benefit of having conservative financial statements following
foreign bank entry is also likely to vary across firms. Firms that are dependent on external
financing, particularly informationally-opaque firms that rely heavily on bank loans, may
find it more beneficial to increase conservatism if doing so can increase the odds of
maintaining credit access in a financial market with foreign lenders. As a result, small
and private firms, which are typically more informationally-opaque and dependent on
bank financing, may have the greatest incentive to adjust accounting policies following
foreign bank entry.8 Non-group firms may also have a greater incentive to improve the
conservatism of their financial statements if they are more likely to depend on external
financing. Our second hypothesis is stated as follows:

8

Theory also suggests that soft-information loans are more likely to decline after foreign bank entry
(Gormley, 2007; Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressal, 2008). Given this, informationally-opaque firms, which
rely more heavily on soft-information lending, may also have a greater incentive to improve conservatism
so as to avoid an adverse drop in their credit access after foreign bank entry.

12

HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2): The change in timely loss recognition will be more
pronounced among firms with greater external financing dependence, such as
small, private, and non-group firms.
Finally, if increased timely loss recognition reduces the risk born by lenders in
assessing firms’ creditworthiness, we expect lenders to reward firms who increase their
timely loss recognition by granting relatively more credit to these firms. Therefore, our
third hypothesis is stated as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3): The change in timely loss recognition after foreign bank
entry will be positively associated with firms’ access to credit.
3. Data and research design
3.1. Data
The data set used to identify the location and opening date for each foreign bank
in India is the Directory of Bank Offices published by the Reserve Bank of India.
Providing the location, name, opening date, and closing date for every bank office in
India, the data are used to construct a complete annual directory of all banks in India
from 1988 to 2002.
With these data, it is possible to map out the timing and location of arrival for the
new foreign banks. Table 1 shows the number of foreign banks by district and year from
1990 to 2002. In the top half of the table are the 18 districts that already had a foreign
bank before 1991. These include the three districts with very large metropolitan centers:
Delhi, Greater Mumbai, and Kolkata. In the bottom half are the eight districts that
received their first foreign bank during the 1990s. As can be quickly seen, the overall
increase in foreign bank branches largely coincides with the signing of the GATS in
13

1994, but the actual timing of entry across these eight districts is staggered across years.
The district location of new foreign banks is mapped in Figure 1, which highlights the
eight districts that received their first foreign bank between 1991 and 2002. The eight
districts are relatively dispersed across India, spanning seven of India’s 35 states.9
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The bank location data are matched up to the Prowess data set compiled by the
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess is a panel data set of firms
from 1988 to 2002 where both listed and unlisted publicly limited Indian and foreign
firms with assets plus sales greater than 40 million Rupees (approx. $900,000) are
included in the data set.10 The data set provides the annual financial and accounting data
of each firm along with descriptive variables including the ownership, year of
incorporation, and registered address. Using each firm’s address, it is possible to track
their financial status at the district level and to merge this data to the district location of
the new foreign banks in India. To ensure a comparable sample of control firms, we
exclude firm-year observations for firms located in the districts that already have a
foreign bank prior to liberalization. Because these districts experience additional entry
after liberalization and the existing foreign banks may also be expanding operations, the
inclusion of these districts as a control sample for the eight districts receiving their first

9

Citibank and HSBC were responsible for half of the new foreign bank branches in the eight districts.
Other banks opening branches in these districts were ABN AMRO, American Express Bank Ltd., ANZ
Grindlays, BNP Paribas, Crédit Lyonnais, Deutsche Bank (Asia), Société Générale, and Standard
Chartered. Each had pre-existing branches elsewhere in India at the time of entry in the eight districts.
10
CMIE compiles the financial data using the audited annual accounts that all registered companies in India
must submit to the Registrar of Companies. The cutoff level of firm size in the Prowess data set seems to
be an arbitrary point chosen to limit the size of the database.
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foreign bank would be problematic.11 In addition, firms in these districts are likely
different in many ways because of prior foreign bank entry.12 Our final sample consists
of 20,434 firm-year observations for 2,547 unique firms over the period 1988-2002.13
While foreign banks only entered eight new Indian districts after liberalization,
the financial data provided by Prowess indicate that a large number of Indian firms were
likely affected by this entry. Within our sample, these eight districts account for 25
percent of the observed firms and 24 percent of total sales in 1992. These high numbers
reflect foreign banks’ tendency to locate in heavily populated districts.
3.2. Measuring timely loss recognition
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005), we measure timely loss recognition using
a non-linear relation between operating cash flows and accruals. The model is as follows:

ACC it  1DCFOit   2CFOit  3 DCFOit  CFOit   it

(1)

The dependent variable ACCit is accruals computed as [(∆CAit – ∆Cashit ) –
(∆CLit - ∆STDit ) – DEPit ] scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, where ∆CA is the
change in current assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash and bank balances, ∆CL is the
change in current liabilities, ∆STD is the change in short term debt, and DEP is
depreciation expense.14 CFO represents the operating cash flows (scaled by total assets),
measured as the difference between ROA and ACC , where ROA is the profit after tax
charges scaled by total assets. Accruals are subtracted from ROA to undo the accrual
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To the extent that an increased presence of foreign banks in these districts is associated with an increase
in timely loss recognition for firms in these districts (see Section 4.2.6), the inclusion of these districts as a
control would cause us to understate the true causal effect of foreign bank entry.
12
Comparing the summary statistics in Appendix Table 1 with those in Table 2 suggests that firms located
in the areas with prior foreign bank entry are much larger in size, on average, than firms in our sample.
They are also more profitable, as measured by their return on assets, and have higher operating cash flows.
13
Our findings are also robust to restricting the sample to India’s post-liberalization period of 1992-2002.
14
We use this methodology to calculate accruals as detailed cash flow data are largely unavailable in India.
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accounting methods used to calculate firms’ cash flows and to better reflect the true level
of current operating cash flows generated by the firm. DCFO is an indicator variable
equal to one if CFO is negative, and zero otherwise.
Firms that engage in a timely recognition of economic gains and losses will
exhibit a positive correlation between accruals, ACC, and contemporaneous cash flows,
CFO. The positive correlation comes from the fact that cash flows generated from
individual durable assets (such as plant and equipment) tend to be correlated over time
(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). For example, a piece of equipment that generates less cash
today due to changes in product market conditions is also likely to experience a
downward revision in its expected future cash flows. If these revisions of future cash
flow expectations are incorporated into current-period accruals by a firm in a timely
fashion, a positive correlation between accruals, ACC, and contemporaneous cash flows,
CFO, will occur. In this example, a decline in expected future cash flows may be
accounted for in accruals through a markdown in the value of assets or inventory.
The more timely firms are in their recognition of expected losses, the stronger the
positive correlation between accruals, ACC, and operating cash flows, CFO, will be when
cash flows are negative. Thus, the level of timely loss recognition is increasing in the
coefficient, β3. This will be our primary coefficient of interest throughout the paper. A
timely recognition of gains would instead be captured by a positive correlation between
cash flows and accruals when current cash flows are positive. However, because standard
accounting practices generally do not allow firms to account for expected future gains in
cash flows until those gains are actually realized, there is little positive correlation
between positive cash flows and accruals on average. Instead, the use of accruals to
mitigate cash flow noise generally causes a negative relation between cash flows and
16

accruals (i.e. β2<0) (Dechow, 1994; Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998).15 This
asymmetry in the correlation between accruals and cash flows is why timely loss
recognition is often referred to as ‘asymmetric timeliness’.
3.3. Research design
To test whether foreign bank entry is correlated with timely loss recognition, we
expand model (1) by introducing a dummy variable, Bank, to capture foreign bank entry,
and interact it with other explanatory variables in model (1). In particular, the model we
estimate is specified as follows:
ACC idt  1DCFOidt   2CFOidt   3 DCFOidt  CFOidt
  4 Bankdt   5 Bankdt  DCFOidt   6 Bankdt  CFOidt
  7 Bankdt  DCFOidt  CFOidt   i   t  X idt
 t  DCFOidt   t  CFOidt   t  DCFOidt  CFOidt

(2)

 Ed  DCFOidt  Ed  CFOidt  Ed  DCFOidt  CFOidt   it

where Bankdt is equal to one if a foreign bank is present in district d in year t , and zero
otherwise. The regression includes firm fixed effects,  i , to control for time-invariant
differences across firms, and year fixed effects,  t , and year fixed effects interacted with
DCFO, CFO, and DCFO×CFO to control non-secular time trends in average timely loss
recognition across India. The regression also includes DCFO, CFO, and DCFO×CFO
interactions with Ed, an indicator that equals one for the districts that eventually receive a
foreign bank. These interactions control for average differences in timely loss
recognition across the two types of districts. Time-varying controls, Xidt, for size (SIZE),
leverage (LEV), and sales growth (SG) along with their interaction with CFO, DCFO, and
15

Firms use accrual accounting to mitigate noise in operating cash flows and to produce a better matching
of expenses against revenues. For example, accrual accounting attempts to eliminate the transitory
variations in cash flows by matching the cost of inventory sold, rather than current-period payments for
inventory purchased, against sales revenue. This noise-reduction role of accruals will tend to create a
negative correlation between accruals and cash flows from operations.
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CFO*DCFO are also included, where SIZE is natural log of total assets, LEV is bank
borrowings scaled by total assets, and SG is sales growth, which is equal to ((salest –
sales t-1) / sales t-1).16

Since foreign entry occurs at the district level, standard errors are

clustered at the district-level.
By interacting Bankdt with the main specification of Ball and Shivakumar (2005)
and including the year and Ed interactions, this new specification will make use of
variation both in the location and in the timing of foreign bank entry to identify the
impact of foreign bank entry on timely loss recognition. The main coefficient of interest,
β7, will test the changes in timely loss recognition for firms located in a district with a
new foreign bank after its entry relative to changes for firms located elsewhere in India.
A positive β7 would support Hypothesis 1 (H1) and indicate that timely loss recognition
increased for firms located near a new foreign bank after entry relative to other firms
located elsewhere in India. β6 captures any average change in the correlation between
accruals and positive cash flows after foreign bank entry. Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki
(2003) argue that a larger negative relation between accruals and cash flows can indicate
the smoothing of reported earnings that does not reflect underlying economic
performance. If firms smooth earnings less after foreign bank entry, which would reflect
another type of accounting improvement, we might also expect the coefficient, β6, to be
positive. This type of improvement would also cause a positive β7, which again would be
beneficial to lenders who are likely concerned about the use of smoothing in negative
cash flow years to disguise bad performance.
The use of variation in both the location and timing of foreign bank entry reduces
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Market-to-book ratio is frequently used as a factor related with timely loss recognition. Due to the
presence of unlisted public limited firms in our sample, we are unable to obtain market-to-book ratio for all
firms. Instead, we use sales growth as an alternative proxy for growth opportunities.
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potential confounding effects that might arise from country-wide changes in accounting
standards or fixed differences in reporting policies across firms. Changes in average
timely loss recognition over time, which might arise from other country-level reforms or
changes in financial competitiveness, would be absorbed by the year dummies and their
interactions with DCFO, CFO, and DCFO×CFO.
This difference-in-difference estimation relies on two identification assumptions.
First, it implicitly assumes that the effect of foreign bank entry is localized and realized
predominately by firms headquartered in the district with a foreign bank. In general, we
expect this to hold as empirical work in other countries has demonstrated the average
distance between firms and their bank is usually quite small.17 However, even if this
assumption is not fully true, this would only bias the results against finding an effect of
foreign bank entry on timely loss recognition because some firms affected by foreign
bank entry would be wrongly classified as control firms in the estimation.18
The second identification assumption is that foreign banks did not select into
districts that were already trending differently or going to trend differently in the future,
with respect to firms’ recognition of economic losses, for reasons unrelated to the actual
entry. Consistent with this assumption, it is shown later that there is no evidence of
differences in timely loss recognition across Indian districts prior to foreign bank entry.
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Analyzing small firms in the U.S., Petersen and Rajan (2002) finds that the average distance between a
firm and its main bank was 67.8 miles in 1993, and the median distance was five miles. The Indian
districts included in this sample had an average size of 2,457 square miles. While the U.S. firms sampled
were on average six times smaller than the firms found in the Prowess data, it is likely the Indian firms also
borrow locally as the positive relation between distance and borrowing costs is likely greater in a
developing country such as India. Recent work on lending relationships and loan prices in Belgium and the
U.S. also suggest that greater lending distances are associated with increased transportation and
informational costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2007).
18
As a robustness check, we also examine the relation between foreign bank entry and timely loss
recognition for firms located in districts that share a border with a district that experiences foreign bank
entry. Results suggest that timely loss recognition does not change for these firms after foreign bank entry,
which lends empirical support to our identification assumption.
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There is also little reason to expect that foreign banks’ location choices would be directly
related to expectations of future changes in the conservatism of firms’ financial
statements. We come back to elaborate on this issue later in Section 5.1.
Another related concern, however, may be that foreign banks selected into
districts with differential trends in growth opportunities and/or cash flow shocks and their
persistence, which may itself be directly related to timely loss recognition.19 To account
for this possibility, we also include controls for growth opportunities and other timevarying variables such as SIZE, LEV, and SG and each of the three controls is also
interacted with DCFO, CFO, and DCFO*CFO throughout the empirical analyses. By
including these controls, our estimates will only pick up the affect of foreign bank entry
on the timeliness of loss recognition that is not going through a differential change in one
of these fundamentals.20 Our findings are also robust to including district-level controls
for growth. These robustness tests are discussed in Section 5.1.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our sample of firms. The average total
assets of firms in our sample is 2.5 billion Rupee (approximately $60 million) and the
median is 320 million Rp (approximately $7.4 million). ROA (net income/assets) has a
mean of -0.4 percent and a median of 1.2 percent, suggesting that on average, Indian
firms incur losses. Accruals has a mean of -0.005, indicating that accruals decrease
income on average in India, and cash flows has a mean of 0.
19

Growth opportunities, leverage and size have each been linked to timely loss recognition (LaFond and
Watts, 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007).
20
Moreover, if foreign bank entry is causing a reduction in leverage or sales growth for some firms, as
shown in Gormley (2010), then these time-varying controls will also capture any incremental effect that
these changes in fundamentals might have on the timeliness of loss recognition.
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Profitability and cash flows of firms in districts where foreign bank entry occurs
are similar to the profitability and cash flows of firms in districts with no foreign bank
entry. Panel B presents separately the summary statistics for firms located in the districts
with foreign bank entry (N=6,259), and Panel C presents summary statistics for firms
located in districts with no foreign bank entry (N=14,175). On average, firms located in
districts with foreign bank entry are slightly more profitable, and have higher accruals
and lower cash flows compared to firms located in districts where foreign bank entry
does not occur, but the differences are small and not statistically different.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4.2. Regression results
4.2.1. Timely loss recognition prior to foreign bank entry
Before we test our hypotheses, we first investigate whether timely loss
recognition is present in India prior to foreign banks’ entry beginning in 1994 and
whether it varies across districts in a way that may raise concerns about our identification
strategy. We do this by separately estimating equation (1), using only financial data from
1988-1993, for both districts that eventually receive a foreign bank and those that do not.
We also include the time-varying controls for size, leverage, and growth along with their
interactions as described earlier. The results are reported in Table 3.
Prior to foreign bank entry, there does not appear to be any evidence of timely
loss recognition among Indian firms, and there is no evidence to indicate that the timely
loss recognition was significantly different in districts that later experience foreign bank
entry relative to districts that do not experience entry. The coefficient, β3, is negative and
statistically insignificant for firms located in districts that eventually experience foreign
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bank entry [Table 3, Column (i)] and among firms located in districts that do not
experience entry [Table 3, Column (ii)]. This finding lends support to our identification
assumption that timely loss recognition in the districts with foreign bank entry is not
significantly different from that in other districts prior to foreign bank entry. This finding
is also consistent with the evidence from Bushman and Piotroski (2006) that less
developed debt and equity markets, together with weak legal protections, contribute to a
lower level of timely loss recognition. Lastly, the coefficient, β2, is negative and
statistically significant for both groups of firms, confirming the use of accruals to
mitigate cash flow noise.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2.2. Timely loss recognition following foreign bank entry
Based on the first hypothesis, we predict that firms located in the foreign bank
entry districts will increase timely loss recognition after foreign bank entry. The OLS
estimates of equation (2) are reported in Table 4. Consistent with our hypothesis, the
coefficient on the variable of interest, β7, is positive and statistically significant at the five
percent significance level. This result also indicates that firms reduce the smoothing of
earnings in negative cash flow years after foreign bank entry. The increase in timely loss
recognition after foreign bank entry is not only statistically significant, but is also
economically significant. The incidence of foreign bank entry increases timely loss
recognition by about seventy-five percent from 0.129 to 0.226. The negative and
insignificant coefficient, β6, suggests that the smoothing of earnings in positive cash flow
years does not change after foreign bank entry.
[Insert Table 4 here]
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This increase in timely loss recognition following foreign bank entry is robust to
controlling for other important factors that are known to affect timely loss recognition
(e.g., Beatty, Weber, and Yu, 2008; Zhang, 2008). The estimates in Table 4 include
controls for size, leverage, and growth, and their interactions with DCFO, CFO, and
DCFO*CFO. The increase is also not driven by country-level changes in accounting
practices.21 The year dummies interacted with DCFO, CFO, and DCFO×CFO would
capture any country-wide change in reporting policies during the sample period.
One concern might be that other country-level accounting or financial reforms
during the sample period may be differentially affecting the firms in the districts
experiencing foreign bank entry. In this case, our estimation may be wrongly attributing
the improvements in conservatism to the impact of foreign bank entry. To test for a
possible pre-existing, differential trend in timely loss recognition, we estimate a modified
version of equation (2), where we allow the effect of foreign bank entry to vary by year in
a five-year window surrounding foreign bank entry into each district. The yearly point
estimates of BANK×DCFO×CFO are reported in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The timing of the increase in timely loss recognition coincides with foreign bank
entry. As seen in Figure 2, there is no indication of a differential trend in timely loss
recognition prior to foreign bank entry; firms located in districts experiencing foreign
bank entry do not appear to be trending differently prior to foreign bank entry.22 But
after entry, firms located in a district with foreign entry tend to increase their timely loss
21

Accounting practices may be related to accounting standards (E.g. Joos and Lang, 1994; Barth, Clinch,
and Shibano, 1999; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Leuz, 2003), tax systems (Guenther and Young, 2000),
institutional factors (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki,
2003; Leuz, 2006), and political connections (Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2009).
22
The plotted coefficients measure the change in BANK×DCFO×CFO (from its level in the initial sample
year) for affected firms relative to other firms. The confidence intervals shown have much less power than
estimates from equation (2) because they compare each year separately against the reference period.
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recognition relative to firms located in other districts. The precise timing of the shift in
accounting conservatism suggests that it is in fact caused by foreign bank entry, rather
than by any omitted firm characteristic or other country-level reforms. In order for other
country-level reforms to drive this shift, it must be that they differentially affect firms
located in districts experiencing foreign bank entry, and do so at various points in time
coinciding with foreign bank entry into each different district between 1994 and 2002.
The increase in timely loss recognition is also robust to restricting the sample to
only firms located in eight districts experiencing foreign bank entry. In doing this, we
further exclude the possibility that differential trends between firms located in the
districts with foreign bank entry and those that never experience such entry are driving
our findings. These robustness tests are discussed further in Section 5.
4.2.3. Cross-sectional changes in timely loss recognition
Our second hypothesis predicts that certain firms – those that are more dependent
on external financing – are more likely to increase timely loss recognition when changes
in the lending environment increase the demand for conservative financial statements.
We analyze this possibility by re-estimating equation (2) based on subsamples of firms
broken down by size, legal ownership, group-affiliation, and need for external financing.
These estimates are reported in Tables 5-8.
Splitting the full sample into two groups based on the median of assets, we find
that the increase in the timely loss recognition is greater, on average, among smaller firms.
This is seen in Table 5, where the coefficient on the variable of interest, β7, is positive and
statistically significant at the ten percent level for firms with assets below the median
sample value [Table 5, Column (ii)] but negative and non-significant for firms with assets
above the median value [Table 5, Column (i)]. This result suggests that smaller firms
24

disproportionally increased timely loss recognition after foreign bank entry, which is
consistent with Hypothesis 2.23 The difference in the estimate of β7 between the small and
the large firms is statistically significant at the five percent level. In addition, the
coefficient, β2, is greater in absolute value for large firms than for small firms, which is
consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005) who argue that accruals mitigate more cash
flow noise in larger firms. The coefficient, β6, is negative but statistically not significant
for both large and small firms, suggesting that the mitigating role of accruals in cash flow
noise and the smoothing of reported earnings for positive cash flow years does not
change across firm size after foreign bank entry.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The increase in timely loss recognition also appears larger, on average, among
private firms. This is seen in Table 6, where we split between public and private firms.
While we find a statistically significant increase in timely loss recognition for public
firms [Column (i)], the average increase among private firms [Column (ii)] is nearly
twice as large as that of public firms, and the difference between public and private firms
is statistically significant at the ten percent level. This evidence is consistent with the
argument that private firms may be more dependent on bank financing than public firms.
[Insert Table 6 here]
We also find an increase in timely loss recognition among non-group firms, which
may be more dependent on external financing. This is shown in Table 7 where the results
are reported separately based on firms’ group-affiliation. The increase in timely loss
recognition is statistically significant among non-group firms [Table 7, Column (ii)],
whereas the increase for group firms is smaller and not statistically significant [Table 7,
23

It is also possible this finding reflects larger firms’ ability to borrow from lenders at a greater distance
and that these firms are less subject to changes in the local credit market.
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Column (i)]. However, there is no conclusive evidence that group and non-group firms
respond differentially to foreign bank entry: the difference in timely loss recognition
between group and non-group firms is not statistically significant.
[Insert Table 7 here]
We next test whether the change in timely loss recognition varies by a firm’s
external financing dependence using industry-level variation following the methodology
of Rajan and Zingales (1998). Assuming that industry-level external financing needs are
persistent across countries, we measure external financing dependence at the industry
level for Indian firms using data from U.S. firms.24 We then split the sample into firms
with above median external financing dependence, and those with below median
dependence. The estimates are reported in Table 8.
We find evidence that private firms with more external dependence increase
timely loss recognition significantly after foreign bank entry. More specifically, in
columns (i) and (ii) where we report the estimates using the full sample, β7 is not
statistically significant for either high or low dependence firms. When we restrict the
sample to private firms, as done in columns (iii) and (iv), we find that high external
dependence firms increase timely loss recognition significantly after foreign bank entry
while the increase for low external dependence firms is less than half as large and not
statistically significant at conventional levels. The difference between high and lowdependence, private firms, however, is not statistically significant (the p-value of the
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Since Rajan and Zingales’s external financing measure is only available for manufacturing industries, we
lose about one third of our observations in these regressions. Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure industry
external financing needs using international standard industries classification and data for U.S. public firms
from Compustat. Specifically, they calculate the portion of capital expenditure (Item #128) that is not
financed by the cash flows generated from business operations ((Item #110) + decrease in inventory (Item
#3) + decrease in accounts receivable (Item #2) + increase in accounts payable (Item #70)) and scaled by
capital expenditure. See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for more details on how this measure is constructed.
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difference is 0.176).
[Insert Table 8 here]
Taken together, the results in Tables 5-8 suggest that certain firms – those that are
more dependent on external debt funding – are more likely to increase their timely loss
recognition when foreign bank entry occurs. The evidence also suggests that the increase
in timely loss recognition is not just concentrated among foreign banks’ borrowers, which
tend to be larger, more established firms (Berger, Klapper, and Udell, 2001; Haber and
Musacchio, 2004; Mian, 2006; Gormley, 2010). This is consistent with timely loss
recognition becoming more important in domestic banks’ lending decisions after foreign
bank entry, which might occur if domestic banks adopt the ‘best practices’ of foreign
banks or if they increase their intensity of screening and monitoring loans.
Overall, this evidence reinforces the importance of timely loss recognition and its
potential impact on debt contracts (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Harris, 2002; Beatty,
Weber, and Yu, 2008; Guay, 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Zhang, 2008). The
evidence also supports the argument of Ball (2001) and Kothari (2001) that institutional
mechanisms are important in shaping accounting choices. Previous research has explored
the relation between accounting practices and legal institutions (Ball, Kothari, and Robin,
2000), equity market development and investor rights (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003),
tax systems (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Guenther and Young, 2000) and political connections
(Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2009). These findings suggest that banking sector
characteristics may also be important in shaping accounting practices over time.
4.2.4. Timely loss recognition and access to credit
In this section, we test our third hypothesis of whether the increase in timely loss
recognition is correlated with firms’ access to credit markets. An underlying assumption
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of the previous analyses is that lenders value conservative financial reports when making
lending decisions. Absent this, it would be difficult to understand why firms’ timely loss
recognition increases after foreign bank entry.
To test this underlying assumption, we analyze whether the increase in timely loss
recognition is accompanied by an increase in credit access among firms in districts that
experience foreign bank entry. To do this, we first re-estimate equation (2) using only
the firm-year observations of firms located in the eight districts that experience foreign
bank entry over the sample period. The estimates from using this more restrictive sample,
which are reported in column (i) of Table 9, confirm our earlier findings. The increase of
timely loss recognition after foreign entry is still positive and statistically significant at
the one percent level.
[Insert Table 9 here]
To test whether the increase in timely loss recognition is associated with better
access to credit for firms, we then divide the sample into firms that experience an
increase in debt levels after foreign entry and those that do not. This is done based on
whether a firm’s overall amount of bank borrowings increases or declines following
foreign bank entry. If a firm experiences an average decline in total bank borrowings in
the three years after foreign bank entry, we include it in the ‘debt-reduction’ group,
otherwise we include it in the ‘no debt-reduction’ group. In total there are 2,961 firm-year
observations that do not experience credit declines, and 3,298 firm-year observations that
do. If the increase in timely loss recognition helps alleviate credit constraints, then we
expect that the increase in timely loss recognition will be more pronounced for firms in
the ‘no debt-reduction’ group than firms in the ‘debt-reduction’ group.
In fact, this is exactly what the evidence appears to indicate. There is only an
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increase in timely loss recognition among firms not experiencing a drop in overall credit.
This is seen in Table 9, columns (ii) and (iii), where the coefficient, β7, is 0.189 for the
non-debt reduction subsample and statistically significant at the one percent level
compared to a non-significant coefficient of only 0.002 for the debt reduction subsample.
The difference in β7 between the two groups of firms is statistically significant at the five
percent level. The result suggests more timely loss recognition was associated with better
access to credit markets following foreign bank entry and that lenders value timely loss
recognition when making lending decisions.25
4.2.5. Timely loss recognition and accounting practices
We next investigate whether foreign bank entry is related to changes in specific
accounting practices that would potentially contribute to the increase in timely loss
recognition. Similar to before, we restrict our sample to firms in districts that experience
foreign bank entry, but we now regress a number of accounting choice variables that
might reflect greater conservatism onto the indictor for a foreign bank’s presence, BANK,
firm fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The coefficient on BANK will estimate the
extent to which firms’ accounting choices change after foreign bank entry relative to
changes among firms located in districts yet to receive a foreign bank. Our estimates also
include time-varying controls for firms’ size and sales growth. The estimates are
reported in Table 10.
[Insert Table 10 here]
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Combined with the findings of Gormley (2010), where the small firms, on average, experience a drop in
loans, and our earlier finding that small firms, on average, increase their timely loss recognition, this
finding suggests a heterogeneous response among small firms. Some small firms increase timely loss
recognition and maintain their access to credit, whereas others do not and experience a decline in credit.
The finding in Table 9 also suggests that the average decline in credit for small firms would have been even
worse absent the observed increase in timely loss recognition.
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We find evidence that foreign bank entry is associated with changes in accounting
practices that might contribute to the overall increased conservatism in their financial
statements. As seen in Table 10, column (i), foreign bank entry is associated with an
increase in write-offs of fixed assets normalized by average gross fixed assets. This is
consistent with firms being more conservative by timely marking down the value of
assets upon negative shocks. In columns (ii) and (iii), we find increases in bad debt
expenses normalized by total account receivables and extraordinary expenses normalized
by total sales. Both increases can contribute to an increase in conservatism. We also find
an increase in the provision of contingencies scaled by total assets, but the increase is not
statistically significant.
4.2.6. Timely loss recognition and the extent of foreign bank entry
In this section, we test whether the change in timely loss recognition increases
with the extent of foreign bank entry. Theoretically, it is not clear whether such a
positive relation would exist. If increased conservatism is partially driven by foreign
lenders demanding greater timely loss recognition among their clients, then greater
foreign entry might increase the number of firms with foreign bank relationships and
increase the amount of timely loss recognition. On the other hand, it is possible that the
increase in conservatism is driven by the initial entry of foreign lenders rather than the
extent of their entry. This might occur if domestic lenders attempt to adopt the ‘best
practices’ of the foreign bank or if the mere arrival of a new lender and the threat of
greater competition shifts the equilibrium behavior of incumbent lenders (E.g., see
Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Dell’Arricia and Marquez, 2004; Segupta, 2007; Gormley
2010). In this case, the observed increase in timely loss recognition may not increase
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with the extent of foreign bank entry.
To test whether the extent of foreign bank entry is related to timely loss
recognition, we divide our sample based on the extent of foreign bank entry in the eight
districts that experienced entry. In particular, we calculate the share of branches held by
foreign banks in these eight districts at the end of the sample period, and estimate our
main specification separately for the four districts with the highest share of foreign bank
branches and the four districts with the lowest share. The results are reported in Table 11.
[Insert Table 11 here]
We find inconclusive evidence on whether the increase in timely loss recognition
is larger in districts with greater foreign bank entry. For firms located in districts with
high market share of foreign banks, the point estimate on BANK*DCFO*CFO is 0.116
and significant at five percent confidence level, while for the firms in districts with less
entry, the point estimate is smaller and not statistically significant. The difference
between the two subsamples, however, is not significantly different (the p-value of the
difference is 0.28).
5. Robustness tests
5.1. Selection bias
While there is no evidence in Table 3 and Figure 2 to indicate that the levels and
trends of timely loss recognition looked different across districts in India prior to foreign
bank entry, one concern with the above identification strategy is that foreign banks
selectively entered districts where levels of timely loss recognition were going to trend
upward in the future for reasons unrelated to foreign bank entry. For example, a selection
bias might occur if foreign banks choose to locate in regions of India in anticipation of
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future improvements in the conservatism of firms’ financial statements. If this occurred,
the observed correlation between timely loss recognition and foreign bank entry could be
driven by foreign banks’ location choice rather than an increase in the benefit of
providing more conservative financial statements to lenders.
The observed increases in timely loss recognition, however, do not appear to be
driven by foreign banks’ expectations of future accounting changes or firm-level growth
opportunities. First, accounting standards are set at the national level in India, which
makes a foreign bank’s choice of location based on expectations about regional changes
in accounting policies unlikely.26 It is also unclear why national changes in accounting
regulation would affect firms heterogeneously and do so at different points in time that
happens to coincide with foreign bank entry into each of the districts. Second, all our
estimates include controls for firm-level sales growth, which may be related to both
accounting changes (LaFond and Watts, 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007) and
foreign bank entry. Our results are also robust to including district-level controls for
growth, consisting of either the natural logarithm of the number of firms or the natural
logarithm of the number of banks in a district.
Our earlier analysis in Table 9 also suggests that selection bias is not driving our
results. In those estimates, the sample is restricted to only firms located in the eight
districts that experience foreign bank entry during the sample time period. In doing this,
we further exclude the possibility that differential trends between firms located in the
districts with foreign bank entry and those that never experience such entry are driving
our earlier findings. As noted earlier, foreign bank entry is still positively associated with
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In addition to the financial reforms discussed earlier, there were some country-level changes in
accounting standards in India during the sample time period. Details of these miscellaneous changes are
provided on the website of The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, www.icai.org.
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an increase in timely loss recognition in this restricted sample [Table 9, column (i)].27
5.2. Other possible channels
Our evidence is consistent with the increase in timely loss recognition after
foreign bank entry being driven by a change in the demand for more conservative
financial statements. However, it is also possible that foreign bank entry affects firms’
fundamentals negatively via reduced credit access, and in return, the change in
fundamentals affects the accrual-cash flow relation. While our existing time-varying
controls for size, leverage, sales growth, and their interactions with DCFO, CFO, and
DCFO*CFO would likely capture any effect of foreign bank entry on timely loss
recognition through such shifts in firms’ fundamentals, we conduct four additional
robustness tests to address this possible concern.
First, we test whether there is any change in profitability, accruals, or operating
cash flows following foreign bank entry that is not captured by our existing controls. To
do this, we regress these fundamentals onto our main variable of interest, BANK, in a
panel regression that includes both our time-varying controls for size, leverage, and sales
growth and firm and year fixed effects. In untabulated results, we find no incremental
association between foreign bank entry and profitability, accruals, or operating cash
flows. This suggests that our controls for size, leverage, and sales growth, are adequately
capturing any shifts in firm fundamentals caused by foreign entry.28

27

As another robustness test, we also re-estimated our main specification in Table 4 using an instrumental
variable (IV) regression that uses the same instrument for foreign bank entry as Gormley (2010), the
geographical distribution of foreign firms in India before the WTO agreement. In untabulated results, we
found the IV point estimate for BANK*DCFO*CFO to be positive and of similar magnitude to the OLS
estimate in Table 4. While this further suggests that our findings are not driven by a selection bias related
to foreign banks’ location choices, the IV point estimate is very noisy with a p-value of 0.849.
28
In addition, we also test whether there is an incremental change in these fundamentals among firms
where we find the change in timely loss recognition to be more pronounced: small firms, non-group firms,
private firms, and firms with greater external financing needs. We do not find any evidence of this.
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Second, we test the robustness of our findings to adding even more controls for
fundamentals that might be related to both cash flow shocks and foreign bank entry.
These factors include total loans from financial institutions, whether a firm has a bank
loan, ROA, cash holdings scaled by total assets, and capital expenditures scaled by total
assets. We also include these controls interacted with DCFO, CFO, and DCFO×CFO.
Our main finding remains unaltered after including these additional controls.
Third, we examine whether the increase in timely loss recognition after foreign
bank entry is more pronounced only among firms where credit access is adversely
affected by foreign bank entry, as documented in Gormley (2010). Gormley (2010)
shows that credit drops are more significant for smaller firms, group firms, firms with
fewer tangible assets, and firms more dependent on external financing. We find, however,
that the increase in the timeliness does not perfectly overlap with these earlier findings.29
The lack of a complete overlap suggests that the changes in timely loss recognition are
not merely driven by the drop in credit access documented in Gormley (2010).
A possible decline in credit access and its negative cash flow impact also cannot
explain the observed correlation between changes in debt and timely loss recognition.
Table 9 shows that firms that increase the timeliness of loss recognition the most are least
likely, on average, to experience a debt reduction after foreign bank entry occurs. This
suggests that negative shocks to credit access cannot fully explain the increase in timely
loss recognition after foreign bank entry as this would tend to imply that the increase
would predominately occur among firms experiencing debt reductions.
Fourth, we test whether the increase in timely loss recognition is only
29

While we do find an increase in the timeliness for smaller firms and firms with more external financing
needs, we do not find an increase among group firms (see Table 7). Furthermore, Gormley (2010) finds
that credit drop is greater for firms with few tangible assets, but in untabulated results, we find no
difference in the change in timeliness based on the tangibility of firms’ assets.
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concentrated among the least profitable firms, where declines in credit access are more
likely (Gormley 2010). Dividing our sample between the top 10% of firms (in terms of
profitability) and all other firms, as done in Gormley (2010), we find a similar average
increase in timely loss recognition for both sets of firms.30 This again suggests that our
findings are not driven by a deterioration in fundamentals.
5.3. Alternative measure of accounting quality
Throughout the paper we use timely loss recognition to measure the conservatism
of borrowers’ financial statements since this form of conservative financial reporting is
argued to improve debt contracting efficiency. In this section, we apply an alternative
measure of accounting quality that may be of interest to lenders, the positive correlation
between current net income, NIt, and future operating cash flows, CFOt+1.31
The results based on using this alternative measure of accounting quality are less
conclusive. These findings are presented in Table 12. In column (i), the positive and
significant coefficient on BANK*NI indicates that the ability of net income to positively
predict future cash flows increases significantly after foreign bank entry, which is
consistent with improved informativeness.32 In column (ii), net income, NI, is broken

30

The coefficient on BANK*DCFO*CFO is 0.089 in both subsamples. While the increase in timeliness is
not statistically significant in the much smaller sample of very profitable firms, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the observed increase in timeliness is the same in both subsamples.
31
Minnis (2011) argues that an increasing positive correlation between NIt and CFOt+1 reflects an improved
ability of the financial statement data to predict future cash flows, which is particularly relevant to lenders
who use current financial statements to assess borrowers’ ability of paying back debt in the future. In
support of this argument, Minnis (2011) finds a stronger positive correlation for firms with audited
financial reports, which tend to borrow at a lower cost compared to firms with unaudited financial reports.
32
As emphasized by Minnis (2011), however, this improved predictability need not imply increased
conservatism. In fact, more conservative financial reporting will reduce predictability unless it is
associated with less reporting asymmetry. Such a decline in reporting asymmetry appears to be occurring
in our setting given we find both an increase in conservatism and predictability. Furthermore, as seen in
Table 3, Column (i), the coefficient on DCFO×CFO is negative suggesting that Indian firms do not report
conservatively prior to foreign bank entry. In this scenario, an increase in conservatism can both reduce
reporting asymmetry and improve predictability.
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down into cash flows, CFO, and accruals, ACC.

Minnis (2011) argues that the

coefficient on cash flows gauges the persistence of underlying business fundamentals
while the coefficient on accruals captures borrowers’ discretion in improving quality. As
shown in column (ii), both of their interactions with BANK are positive and statistically
significant at the one percent confidence level. While the positive interaction between
BANK and ACC is consistent with an improvement in managerial discretion in financial
reporting after foreign bank entry, we are unable to exclude the possibility that a shift in
business fundamentals might be driving this positive interaction, as suggested by the
positive interaction between BANK and CFO.
[Insert Table 12 here]
5.4. Further discussion
It is worth emphasizing that our findings may not be applicable to foreign bank
entry into developed countries. As discussed earlier, the weak accounting standards and
legal protections in India may contribute to the increase in timely loss recognition for
firms in India. To the extent that this particular channel is driving our findings, we may
not expect to find similar results when foreign bank entry occurs in more developed
countries, like the U.S. However, if our findings are instead driven by other channels,
such as the arrival of a relatively less informed lender that needs to rely more heavily on
information contained within financial statements, our findings would still be applicable
to other scenarios in developed countries, such as the entry of new banks into markets
dominated by incumbent banks that may be more informed about local firms.
Our paper suggests that foreign banks and/or local lenders demand more timely
loss recognition when foreign banks enter India and that borrowers correspondingly
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increase conservatism. A question that our analysis does not analyze is what mechanisms
prevent borrowers from subsequently reducing their timely loss recognition after
obtaining a loan. One possible mechanism is reputational considerations or repeated
interactions with lenders. Borrowers may be concerned about their ability to obtain credit
from the same lender in the future if they do not maintain conservative financial
statements. Another possible mechanism is through high quality audits. Borrowers may
switch to auditors with strong reputations, such as the Big Five international auditors, as a
commitment device to maintain more conservative financial statements. Unfortunately,
our available data do not allow us to test these hypotheses.
6. Conclusion
While ample theory and evidence suggest that firms should adjust their
accounting policies in response to changes in the banking sector that affect the costs and
benefits of being conservative, there is little direct evidence of this occurring. Empirical
evidence is sparse in part because of the difficulty of isolating a change in the benefits of
being conservative that is not also related to other factors that may affect reporting
policies. Our paper overcomes this challenge by exploiting an exogenous increase in the
benefit of being conservative caused by the entry of foreign banks into India during the
1990s. Using this framework, we assess whether firms adjust their timely recognition of
losses in response to changes in the banking industry.
Overall, we find evidence that firms attempt to improve the conservatism of their
financial statements following changes in the lending environment that increase the
benefits of being more transparent to lenders. In particular, we find that the average level
of timely loss recognition increases for firms located in the vicinity of new foreign banks
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following their entry into India. The increases in timely loss recognition are also
concentrated among debt-dependent firms that may have a stronger incentive to alleviate
financing constraints by reducing information asymmetries and agency costs of debt.
Specifically, we find that smaller, non-group, and private firms appear to respond to
changes in the lending environment the most. Private firms with greater dependence on
external financing also appear to respond more than the average firm, and lenders seem to
value these changes. Specifically, firms that improve the most were, on average, more
likely to experience an increase in their debt level after foreign bank entry.
Our evidence suggests the financial market reforms, banking industry changes in
particular, may be another channel through which countries may influence firms’
financial reporting choices. Contrary to changes in regulations regarding disclosure and
auditing rules, which directly affect firms’ accounting policies, our evidence suggests that
banking sector characteristics may indirectly affect financial reporting choices by
improving firms’ incentive to produce more conservative financial statements.
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Figure 1 – Indian Districts with First Foreign Bank Entry between 1994-2002
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Figure 2 ‐‐ Effect of foreign bank entry on timely loss recognition by year
This figure reports the point estimates for BANK*DCFO*CFO from a firm‐level, fixed effects OLS
estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank indicators, firm and year fixed
effects, and additional time‐varying controls and year interactions. The specification is the
same as that reported in Table 4 except that the effect of foreign bank entry, i.e.
BANK*DCFO*CFO , is allowed to vary by year. The model is fully saturated and point estimates
are reported for five years before and after foreign bank entry. Ninety‐five percent confidence
intervals, adjusted
j
for clusteringg at the district level, are also p
plotted.
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Table 1
Number of Foreign Bank Branches in India by District and Year
District Name

State Name

Districts with Pre-Existing Foreign Bank Branches
Amritsar
Punjab
Bangalore Urban
Karnataka
Coimbatore
Tamil Nadu
Darjiling
West Bengal
Delhi
Delhi
Ernakulam
Kerala
Greater Mumbai
Maharashtra
Howrah
West Bengal
Hyderabad
Andhra Pradesh
Kamrup
Assam
Kanpur City
Uttar Pradesh
Kolkata
West Bengal
Kozhikode
Kerala
Chennai
Tamil Nadu
Simla
Himachal Pradesh
South Goa
Goa
Srinagar
Jammu & Kashmir
Vishakhapatnam
Andhra Pradesh

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

3
2
1
1
22
3
51
2
1
1
3
43
1
11
1
1
1
1

3
2
1
1
23
3
52
2
1
1
3
43
1
11
1
1
1
1

3
2
1
1
24
3
52
2
1
1
3
42
1
11
1
1
1
1

3
3
1
1
24
3
51
2
1
1
3
42
1
12
1
1
1
1

3
3
1
1
26
4
51
2
1
1
3
42
1
12
1
1
1
1

3
5
1
1
28
4
55
2
2
1
3
42
1
12
1
1
1
1

3
6
1
1
28
4
58
2
2
1
3
42
1
14
1
1
1
1

3
7
1
1
31
4
63
2
2
1
3
43
1
15
1
1
1
1

3
7
2
1
35
4
65
2
2
1
3
43
1
16
1
1
1
1

2
10
2
1
36
3
63
2
4
1
3
34
1
16
1
1
1
1

1
11
2
1
37
3
64
2
6
1
3
34

1
11
3
1
38
3
64
2
8
1
3
34

1
12
4
1
37
4
63
2
8
1
3
34

16
1

16
1

16
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
2

1
2
1

1
3
1
1

1
3
4
1

1
5
5
1
1
1

1
5
5
1
1
1

1
8
5
2
1
2
1
1

1
8
6
2
2
2
1
1

156

167

174

187

198

196

198

209

212

Districts Receiving First Foreign Bank
Thiruvananthapuram
Kerala
Gujarat
Ahmedabad
Pune
Maharashtra
Chandigarh
Chandigarh
Gurgaon
Haryana
Vadodara
Gujarat
Jaipur
Rajasthan
Ludhiana
Punjab
Total Foreign Bank Branches

149

151

151

152

Notes: Number of foreign bank branches calculated using the Directory of Bank Offices . Bank numbers represent total branches as of March 31 each year.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
This table provides summary statistics for the samples used in the study. Data is obtained from Prowess
data set complied by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). ACC is accruals computed as
[(∆CA –∆Cash )–(∆CL -∆STD )–DEP ] scaled by total assets, where ∆CA is the change in non-cash
current assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash and bank balance, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities,
∆STD is the change in short term debt, and DEP is depreciation expense. CFO is operating cash flows
(scaled by total assets), measured as the difference between ROA and ACC, where ROA is the profit after
tax charges (PAT ) scaled by total assets. Debt is measured using total borrowings from banks.

Mean

Std Dev

Lower
Quartile

Median

Upper
Quartile

Panel A: Full Sample (N=20,434)
ROA
ACC/Assets
CFO/Assets
Total Assets (10 mn. Rp)
Debt/Assets

-0.004
-0.005
0.000
250.167
0.167

0.104
0.198
0.186
1282.002
0.330

-0.013
-0.074
-0.053
11.448
0.039

0.012
0.000
0.000
31.978
0.127

0.041
0.059
0.064
107.956
0.225

Panel B: Districts where foreign bank entry occurs (N=6,259)
ROA
ACC/Assets
CFO/Assets
Total Assets (10 mn. Rp)
Debt/Assets

0.002
0.001
-0.002
231.437
0.133

0.097
0.204
0.195
1583.649
0.150

-0.005
-0.066
-0.053
9.665
0.015

0.013
0.000
0.000
28.880
0.101

0.045
0.064
0.065
100.620
0.191

Panel C: Districts with no foreign bank entry (N=14,175)
ROA
ACC/Assets
CFO/Assets
Total Assets (10 mn. Rp)
Debt/Assets

-0.007
-0.008
0.000
258.437
0.182

0.107
0.195
0.182
1123.286
0.383
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-0.017
-0.077
-0.053
12.242
0.050

0.012
0.000
0.000
33.101
0.138

0.040
0.056
0.064
111.387
0.238

Table 3
Timely loss recognition prior to foreign bank entry
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows (CFO), an indicator for
whether operating cash flows are negative (DCFO), and the interaction of these two variables
(DCFO*CFO) for the years 1988-1993. Firm and year fixed effects are included along with
time-varying controls for size, leverage, and sales growth interacted with each of these
variables. Accruals are computed as [(∆CA t –∆Cash t )–(∆CL t -∆STD t )–DEP t ] scaled by
total assets, where ∆CA is the change in non-cash current assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash
and bank balance, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆STD is the change in short term
debt, and DEP is depreciation expense. CFO is operating cash flows (scaled by total assets),
measured as the difference between ROA and ACC , where ROA is the profit after tax charges
(PAT ) scaled by total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

Bank Entry District
Coeff
t-stat

Non-Bank Entry District
Coeff
t-stat

(i)

(ii)

0.005
-1.001
-0.042

0.27
-26.34
-0.83

0.017
0.980
-0.011

1.48
-26.70
-0.18

X
X
X

X
X
X

92.92
1,036

93.52
3,972
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Table 4
Foreign bank entry and timely loss recognition
This table shows a firm-level, fixed effects OLS estimate of accruals
onto operating cash flows as done in Table 3, but also includes a control
for whether a foreign bank is present in the district, BANK , and the
interaction of this variable with operating cash flows (CFO ), an
indicator for negative operating cash flows (DCFO ), and the interaction
CFO*DCFO . Year fixed effects along with their interactions with
CFO , DCFO , and CFO*DCFO are included. Time-varying controls
for size, leverage, and sales growth along with their interaction with
CFO , DCFO , and CFO*DCFO are also included. The regression
also includes DCFO , CFO , and DCFO×CFO interactions with an
indicator that equals one for the districts that eventually receive a
foreign bank. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)
Coeff

t-stat
(i)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt

-0.015
-0.800
0.129
0.004
0.013
-0.041
0.097

Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)

-0.93
-7.25
0.76
0.56
1.95
-1.19
2.12
X
X
X

79.6
20,434

N
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Table 5
Firm size, foreign bank entry, and timely loss recognition
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank indicators,
firm and year fixed effects, and additional time-varying controls and year interactions as done
in Table 4, but also divides the sample between small and large firms. The estimates for firms
with above median assets are reported in column (i), and estimates for firms with below
median assets are reported in column (ii) . Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

Large Firms
[Assets > median]
Coeff
t-stat

Small Firms
[Assets < median]
Coeff
t-stat

(i)

(ii)

0.014
-0.843
0.078
0.012
0.003
-0.0003
-0.045

0.68
-10.94
0.48
1.57
0.50
-0.01
-0.70

-0.040
-0.728
0.070
-0.003
0.014
-0.090
0.117

-1.28
-3.37
0.26
-0.46
1.21
-1.54
1.76

X
X
X

X
X
X

84.1
10,217

78.4
10,217
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Table 6
Ownership, foreign bank entry, and timely loss recognition
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank
indicators, firm and year fixed effects, and additional time-varying controls and year
interactions as done in Table 4, but also divides the sample between public and private
firms. The estimates for public firms are reported in column (i), and estimates for private
firms are reported in column (ii) . Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

Public Firms
Coeff
t-stat

Private Firms
Coeff
t-stat

(i)

(ii)

-0.003
-0.941
0.356
0.007
0.010
-0.074
0.139

-0.14
-10.86
1.51
0.79
1.03
-1.16
1.24

0.039
-0.755
0.496
-0.002
0.021
-0.104
0.257

0.92
-2.77
1.39
-0.11
1.56
-1.35
1.82

X
X
X

X
X
X

76.9
9,036

75.5
7,066
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Table 7
Group firm, foreign bank entry, and timely loss recognition
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank
indicators, firm and year fixed effects, and additional time-varying controls and year
interactions as done in Table 4, but also divides the sample between public and private firms.
The estimates for group-affiliated firms are reported in column (i), and estimates for nongroup firms are reported in column (ii) . Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

Group Firms
Coeff
t-stat

Non-group Firms
Coeff
t-stat

(i)

(ii)

-0.023
-0.894
-0.037
0.014
0.003
-0.086
0.067

-1.46
-10.31
-0.27
1.82
0.30
-1.24
0.89

0.011
-0.762
0.357
-0.005
0.016
-0.028
0.114

0.48
-4.25
1.50
-0.53
1.57
-0.80
2.16

X
X
X

X
X
X

81.7
8,062

79.3
12,372
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Table 8
External financing depedence, foreign bank entry, and timely loss recognition
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank indicators, firm and year fixed effects, and additional timevarying controls and year interactions as done in Table 4, but also divides the sample based on their level of external financing needs. Following
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we measure external financing dependence at the industry level for Indian firms using data from U.S. firms. If a firm
belongs to an industry that is above median in external financing dependence among all the industries in the sample, we classify it as in high external
dependence group, otherwise as in low external dependence group. The estimates for the full sample of firms are reported in columns (i) and (ii), and
estimates for private firms are reported in columns (iii) and (iv) . Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)
Full Sample
High Dependence
Low Dependence
Coeff
t-stat
Coeff
t-stat
(i)
DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

0.030
-0.658
-0.305
0.015
0.015
-0.059
0.125

Private Firms Only
High Dependence
Low Dependence
Coeff
t-stat
Coeff
t-stat

(ii)
1.08
-2.85
-1.11
1.56
1.56
-0.66
1.30

-0.064
-0.995
0.301
0.012
-0.004
-0.025
0.072

(iii)
-2.77
-6.28
1.59
1.15
-0.30
-0.76
0.87

0.064
-0.475
-0.432
0.039
0.022
-0.248
0.533

(iv)
0.81
-0.81
-0.79
1.77
0.85
-1.67
3.01

-0.037
-1.163
0.426
0.013
0.011
-0.052
0.239

-0.70
-7.22
1.71
0.68
0.50
-0.57
1.52

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

82.8
6,640

77.8
6,759

81.4
1,863

79.4
2,410
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Table 9
Credit access and timely loss recognition after foreign bank entry
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank indicators, firm and year fixed
effects, and additional time-varying controls and year interactions as done in Table 4, but instead restricts the sample
to only include observations from districts that experience foreign bank entry during the sample time period. In
column (i), estimates for the full sample of firms are presented. Columns (ii) and (iii) divide the sample between
firms that experience a decline in total bank loans in the three years after foreign bank entry and those without a
decline. The estimates for firms that experience a drop in bank loans are reported in column (ii), and estimates for all
other firms are reported in column (iii). Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

Only Firms in District
with Foreign Entry
Coeff
t-stat

Firms with
Debt Reduction
Coeff
t-stat

Firms with no
Debt Reduction
Coeff
t-stat

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

-0.027
-1.024
0.266
0.000
0.021
-0.008
0.084

-2.09
-18.97
1.22
-0.02
2.90
-0.57
2.60

-0.027
-1.079
0.310
0.001
0.015
0.002
0.002

-1.06
-10.63
2.27
0.11
1.68
0.06
0.08

-0.016
-0.923
0.144
0.011
0.017
-0.040
0.189

-0.64
-11.61
0.40
0.95
0.89
-0.96
2.74

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

85.2
6,259

85.2
3,298

85.7
2,961
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Table 10
Foreign bank entry, write-offs, bad debt expenses, extraordinary expenses, and provisions
This table shows OLS estimates of various accounting ratios regressed onto the foreign bank indicator, firm and year
fixed effects, and additional time-varying controls for firms located in districts that experience foreign bank entry during
the sample time period. In column (i), the dependent variable is write-offs scaled by average gross fixed assets in years t1 and t ; in column (ii), the dependent variable is bad debt expenses scaled by total account receivables; in column (iii),
the dependent variable is extraordinary expenses scaled by sales; and in column (iv), the dependent variable is provision
for contingencies scaled by average total assets in years t-1 and t . The additional controls time-varying controls are firm
size and sales growth. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Dependent Variable =

Write-offs /
Average Gross
Fixed Asets
Coeff

t-stat

Bad Debt Expenses
/ Total Receivables
Coeff

(i)
BANKdt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

0.006

t-stat

Extraordinary
Expenses / Sales

Provisions for
Contingencies /
Average Assets

Coeff

Coeff

(ii)
2.72

0.037

t-stat
(iii)

1.90

0.070

t-stat
(iv)

2.08

0.00004

1.52

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

66.33
6,129

11.44
6,220

9.53
5,901

15.86
6,259
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Table 11
Extent of foreign bank entry and timely loss recognition
This table shows OLS estimate of accruals onto operating cash flows, foreign bank indicators, firm and year
fixed effects, and additional time-varying controls and year interactions as done in Table 4, but separately
estimates the impact of foreign bank entry based on the extent of their entry into districts. The estimates
for firms located in the four districts with the greatest amount of foreign bank entry by 2002 are reported in
column (i), and estimates for firms located in the four districts with the least (but positive) amount of
foreign bank entry by 2002 are reported in column (ii) . Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Accruals (ACC)

DCFOidt
CFOidt
DCFOidt * CFOidt
BANKdt
BANKdt * DCFOidt
BANKdt * CFOidt
BANKdt *DCFOidt * CFOidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

High entry districts
[Top 4 districts with entry]
Coeff
t-stat

Low entry districts
[Bottom 4 districts with entry]
Coeff
t-stat

(i)

(ii)

-0.015
-0.790
0.147
0.005
0.018
-0.038
0.116

-0.87
-6.56
0.81
0.56
2.89
-0.90
2.15

-0.008
-0.733
0.061
0.007
-0.001
-0.091
0.074

-0.42
-5.41
0.30
0.63
-0.10
-1.61
0.80

X
X
X

X
X
X

79.0
18,369

78.2
16,240
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Table 12
Foreign bank entry and future cash flow predictability
This table shows the OLS estimates of operating cash flows in year t+1 (CFO t+1 ) onto net
income (NI t ), the foreign bank indicator (BANK) and its interaction with net income
(BANK*NI ), firm and year fixed effects, time-varying controls for size, leverage, and sales
growth and their interactions with accruals (ACC t ) and operation cash flows (CFO t ), and
interactions of both CFO and ACC with year fixed effects. The base estimates are reported
in column (i), and estimates where net income is broken down by operating cash flows and
accruals are reported in column (ii) . Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Dependent Variable = Cash Flows from Operations in Year t+1 (CFO t+1 )
Coeff

t-stat

Coeff

t-stat

(i)
NIidt
BANKdt
BANKdt* NIidt
CFOidt
ACCidt
BANKdt*CFOidt
BANKdt*ACCidt
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Additional controls
Adj-R2 (%)
N

0.095
0.006
0.141

(ii)
1.32
0.68
2.56

0.007

0.70

-0.331
0.492
0.196
0.205

-0.52
1.41
3.02
3.49

X
X
X

X
X
X

20.15
17,887

25.84
17,887
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Appendix Table 1
Summary Statistics for Firms Located in Districts
with Previous Foreign Bank Entry
This table provides summary statistics for the observations dropped from the analysis, which are all firms
located in districts that already had a foreign bank present prior to 1991. Data is obtained from Prowess data
set complied by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). ACC is accruals computed as
[(∆CA –∆Cash )–(∆CL -∆STD )–DEP ] scaled by total assets, where ∆CA is the change in non-cash current
assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash and bank balance, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆STD is the
change in short term debt, and DEP is depreciation expense. CFO is operating cash flows (scaled by total
assets), measured as the difference between ROA and ACC , where ROA is the profit after tax charges (PAT )
scaled by total assets. Debt is measured using total borrowings from banks.
Observations in districts with previous foreign bank entry (N=36,957)

ROA
ACC/Assets
CFO/Assets
Total Assets (10 mn. Rp)
Debt/Assets

Mean

Std Dev

Lower
Quartile

Median

Upper
Quartile

0.004
-0.005
0.006
553.918
0.157

0.113
0.212
0.200
4929.810
0.762

-0.003
-0.071
-0.049
10.397
0.005

0.016
0.000
0.000
30.852
0.103

0.047
0.060
0.075
110.520
0.207

57

